At the most basic level, block builders are intermediaries in PoS and PoW systems responsible for ordering and constructing blocks of transactions. This is formalized via Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS): validators propose blocks, but specialized builders compete to assemble them optimally, often by capturing MEV.
Block builders are market-structure entities. They exist in the middle of the stack, positioned between users/transactions and validators/consensus. The economic question: who captures the rents from ordering rights, and how sustainable are those rents?
Builders rely on proprietary orderflow, exclusive partnerships with wallets, or privileged transaction streams. The more “captive” the orderflow, the more builders commoditize validators (supply side). Example: a wallet routing trades through a preferred builder, ensuring exclusive MEV capture.
Externalized network effects (open builders):
Builders rely on open ecosystems, competing in public auctions (e.g., MEV-Boost). Here, the network effect comes from ecosystem-wide participation. Builders must support a broad set of searchers and validators to remain competitive.
The balance resembles platforms vs aggregators:
Internalized builders act like aggregators (intermediate + extract rents).
Externalized builders act more like platforms (facilitate ecosystem-wide coordination).
Platform vs. Aggregator Dynamics
Platform-style builders:
Provide neutral block-building infrastructure
Facilitate relationships between searchers (who generate MEV strategies) and validators (who propose blocks)
Value comes from standardization and reliability
Example: Flashbots’ original MEV-Boost
Aggregator-style builders:
Intermediate the transaction flow
Capture rent by controlling distribution of orderflow — e.g., exclusive wallet deals (like PayPal routing all trades through one PSP as a hypothetical)
Example: A private builder with wallet partnerships
Unit Economics by Builder Type
Unit economics depend on how block builders source and package transactions:
Open Auction Builders (PBS/MEV-Boost)
Cost: Compute + infra to compete in milliseconds across all validators
Revenue: Margins from MEV, but thin since auctions are competitive
Unit economics: Scale matters — high throughput, low margin, sustainable only with infra efficiency
Ultimately, builders are market-structure utilities: profitability depends less on retail adoption than on where transaction rights sit in the stack — wallets, relays, validators, or builders